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Abstract 
 
This paper tackles state participation in the Russian financial sector. We take the case of the 
banking industry to suggest criteria for a more accurate definition of public sector boundaries 
and an assessment of the actual scale of state presence in the national banking market. The 
approach for the assessment of the extent of state participation is based on the analysis of the 
peculiarity of the Russian banking industry due to the high extent and institutional specificity 
of government intervention in the financial system. The results presented in this paper provide 
evidence that the existing channels of state influence over banks are not limited to equity 
ownership with governance and other methods of control being employed as well and prove 
the hypothesis about the presence of downward bias in official estimates of the existing scale 
of state penetration.  
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1. Introduction 
In many emerging markets the key players in the banking industry are fully or partially 
controlled by the state. The state-banking phenomenon is believed to render national financial 
sector less efficient due to politically-motivated credit decisions and to hinder bank 
intermediation.  
In the case of Russia, analysis of state participation in the banking industry requires a 
more in-depth analysis with special regard to its institutional basis such as bank ownership 
control. An accurate re-definition of public sector boundaries is crucial for all kinds of further 
analysis, e.g. the impact of direct state presence on performance indicators and relative 
efficiency of banks and the nature of their activities. An attempt to provide an approach to the 
evaluation of the size of public sector in the Russian banking market is provided in this paper. 
We put forward the hypothesis that the actual scale of state presence in the national 
banking system may differ substantially from most official estimates based on combined 
market shares of largest «official» state-owned banks. Ownership-based estimates might have a 
downward bias, i.e. they miss chunks of the industry that are not formally owned by the state. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing approaches to the 
assessment of the boundaries of state-banking sector and mentions some of the estimates of 
public sector size in Russia. Section 3 describes our data and sample. Section 4 contains the 
definitions that we introduce to arrive at a more comprehensive classification of state-
influenced banks. Section 5 describes our empirical results and suggests their interpretation. 
Section 6 concludes with the main findings and directions for further research.  
 
2. Review of literature  
In the recent years a number of research papers on state participation in the banking 
industry have been published. They shed light on various aspects of state-banking phenomenon 
such as the stimuli and reasons for state presence, relative efficiency of state-controlled banks 
as well as their impact on the development of financial intermediation and economic growth.  
 La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer [2002] define a state owned bank as a bank 
with state share (both direct and indirect – with state-owned enterprises acting as a 
stockholder) of above 50%, or 20% if the state is the largest known shareholder. The criterion 
of at least 50% of federal, regional and/or municipal ownership is followed by absolute 
majority of authors, e.g. [Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2002; EBRD, 2006]. Iannotta, Nocera and 
Sironi [2007] consider a bank as government-owned if either national or local government is 
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its ultimate owner, i.e. a holder of more than 24.9% of the bank’s equity capital with no other 
single shareholder owning a larger share. 
 Russian scholars also tend to follow the mainstream in terms of ownership type 
classification. Analysis of public sector in the banking industry is usually limited to a few 
largest banks fully or majority-owned by the state. Handruyev et al. [2000] regard a bank as 
state bank if government stake in its charter capital exceeds 50%. Babayev [2007] defines state 
banks as banks with 100% government share in registered capital and state controlled banks as 
banks with 50-100% state ownership.  
 In sum, most of the literature assesses the scale of state participation solely on the basis 
of ownership structure of banks. Barth, Caprio and Levine [2002] limit state ownership of 
banks to the fraction of the banking system assets that is 50% or more government-owned. 
 Vernikov [2007] tried to offer a more comprehensive approach to the assessment of 
state presence in Russian banking by putting forward the notion of «broad state» as bank 
stockholder or beneficiary, which included public authorities and state-owned enterprises at all 
levels, as well as prominent political figures. 
Estimates of the scale of state presence in the Russian banking industry vary broadly. 
Following Russian official statistical sources, Raiffeisen [2006] and Moody’s [2007] argue that 
the state accounts for just about 35-40% of total assets. RosBusinessConsulting [2007] put the 
share of top state-owned banks at 43% of total banking assets. Vernikov [2007] estimated the 
scope of presence of the «broad state» in the banking industry to total some 45% as of the year-
end 2005. Ivanter [2009] claims the overall asset share of state banks and quasi-state banks 
(those controlled by state enterprises, public authorities, etc.) to total some 54% as of 
01.04.2009, having soared from 46.5% at 01.09.2008.  
 
3. The data and sample 
Our empirical analysis covered some 150 top Russian banks in terms of their book 
value of assets as of 01.01.2009. Along with those, subsidiary banks with lower positions in 
asset ranking but with one of the top banks as a parent company were taken into account as 
well. At the first stage we searched through all publicly available information on each bank in 
the sample that might appear relevant in identifying «state relatedness» of a bank, i.e. 
information on current or former owners and top managers, subsidiary and associated 
companies (both domestic and foreign), affiliated persons, etc. We relied on data collected 
from banks’ web-sites, rating agencies’ analytical surveys and statistical reviews on the 
national banking market and relevant media sources. At this stage banks for which none of 
these criteria has been discovered were excluded from the sample. The remaining ones were 
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analyzed more thoroughly in order to detect all existing channels of a «with state relation» and 
their possible combinations.  The final sample consists of 64 banks. We then attempted to 
arrange several basic preliminary groupings of sampled banks based on identified similar 
characteristics, i.e. participation of state-connected entities / authorities / individual officials 
among owners / executives / affiliated persons and develop the overall classification of banks 
as described below.  
We consider it reasonable to extend our analysis to the State Corporation «Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)» (hereinafter – VEB). 
Despite the legal status of a State Corporation the nature of VEB activities is in some cases 
similar to that of state-owned banking entities in our sample. Our objective here is a 
substantive evaluation of the actual extent of state penetration in bank-type activity, regardless 
of formalities whether VEB does or does not possess a banking license from CBR. Financial 
support provided by the state and directed at backing tiny and «thin-skinned» private banks is 
realized both via VEB financing programs as well as by the means of purposive funding of key 
state banks. VEB loans to Russian non-financial enterprises belong to the fraction of financial 
assets under state control; therefore leaving VEB banking assets out would lead to 
underestimation of state presence. 
State-owned and state-controlled banks often operate in the form of multi-tier vertical 
structures where the mother company (either bank or non-bank enterprise) is owned or 
controlled by the state and in turn owns or controls several enterprises and banks below. In 
Gazprombank, the third largest bank, the state-controlled Gazprom corporation acts as the 
largest shareholder directly and via affiliated companies, and the bank in turn controls several 
subsidiary banks that have their own subsidiaries. The same goes for the Russia’s second-
largest bank, government-owned VTB. Hence, the existing structure of the national banking 
industry requires a thorough analysis of all layers of hierarchy. 
Thus a bank formally classified as private may be subject to considerable influence of 
the state, both public authorities and individual officials at federal, regional and municipal 
levels. Such influence is executed via control over banks’ decision-making on credit allocation, 
and involvement in politically-motivated activities like acquisition of assets, providing services 
to priority industries, sectors or types of borrowers, etc. Dozens of Russian banks face a trade-
off between profit-maximization and the desire to retain loyalty to public authorities in order to 
ensure from the state consequent support of both financial and non-financial nature. Those 
banks that choose to operate following political guidelines may be regarded as more or less 
state-related. 
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4. Scope and definitions 
Thus we argue that, to draw a more realistic boundary of state presence in a country’s 
banking, one must go beyond the analysis of banks’ ownership type. Correct identification and 
classification also requires an analysis of other possible channels of control over banks that the 
state and its representatives can exercise through governance and otherwise. This is particularly 
relevant in the Russian context and in view of the institutional environment. This, unlike 
ownership type, remains the least examined aspect. We also believe that constructing a more 
relevant definition of public sector is vital for accuracy of subsequent empirical research. 
We distinguish three potential channels of state participation: ownership, governance 
and other forms of control.  
Firstly, we have explored the ownership structure of the banks in the sample, 
penetrating through as many levels of each bank’s ownership hierarchy as it was possible given 
publicly disclosed information. We relied chiefly on official data provided in issuers’ quarterly 
reports (kvartalniy otchet emitenta tsennykh bumag), information on affiliated persons 
published on bank web-sites as well as other relevant information that was publicly available. 
All banks with state participation regardless of the ultimate equity share of the state have been 
divided into two broad groups: (a) directly state-owned banks, and (b) banks that are indirectly 
state-owned. Group A consists of banks with federal, regional governments, local 
administrations, the Central Bank of Russia (hereinafter - CBR) and federal or regional 
property funds acting as a stockholders. Group B comprises banks whose capital is owned 
either in full or partly by non-financial enterprises, non-bank financial institutions or by banks 
that are in turn state-owned.  
Secondly, state influence on banks may be realized via its participation in governance. 
We have identified two broad sub-groups of banks: (a) those with the presence of 
representatives of legislative and executive bodies (federal, regional governments, local 
administrations) in the Board or Supervisory Council – we called them «directly state-
governed banks»; and (b) banks where executives of state-owned or state-governed enterprises 
(i.e. non-financial enterprises, non-bank financial institutions or banks) act as members of the 
Board or Supervisory Council. These latter were defined as «indirectly state-governed banks».  
 The third criterion of classification as state-related is focused on other existing channels 
of bank-state interaction besides ownership or governance. Banks to which this applies are 
broadly defined as «politically-connected». Here we rely upon the definition of «politically 
connected firms» provided in [Faccio, 2006] for companies «in which top officials or 
politicians act as shareholders or members of the board or good friends of main owners» with 
regard to national banks’ operating specificity. To be more specific, this may be the case if: 
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- representatives of legislative and executive bodies are among bank shareholders, former 
or current;  
- CBR representatives are authorized to control a bank’s funds placement decisions;  
- Deposit Insurance Agency acts as arbitration manager in a bankruptcy process; 
- the bank is appointed as official provider of financial services to key 
industries/sectors/groups of borrowers of the region;  
- the bank is empowered by the state to manage local administration’s or regional 
government’s accounts. 
 The resulting classification of banks in the sample is presented in Fig.1. 
Figure 1: State participation in banking 
 
 All banks with state participation may be aggregated into three broad categories. The 
narrowest category includes «state-owned banks» whose equity is majority-owned by the 
state, e.g. when state authorities of all levels act as a direct shareholder or a majority stake in a 
bank is owned by state-owned enterprises. 
 The second category that we defined as «state-controlled banks» includes, in addition 
to «state-owned banks», also banks with minority state share in equity but with identified state 
participation in governance, either direct or indirect.   
We should admit that taking the presence of individual officials - representatives of 
legislative or executive bodies’, i.e. federal, regional governments’, local administrations’ - in 
the Board or Supervisory Council of a bank as a criterion for a bank’s being regarded as state-
controlled might induce a twofold bias in authors’ estimation of the existing scale of state 
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influence. On the one hand, presence of government officials in a bank might reflect the 
phenomenon of «state capture», i.e. the desire of the state to execute control over bank’s 
activities as described above. On the other hand, promoting bank’s affiliates to authorities of 
any level might result from the desire of its owners to obtain a kind of «special treatment », i.e. 
state loyalty and support, procured by contiguity with corridors of power – the so called 
phenomenon of «business capture». Despite the two-way ambiguity of this aspect we insist on 
the expedience of including this factor into our analysis lest we should underestimate the 
existing scale of state presence. 
 Finally, «state-owned banks» and «state-controlled banks» as well as all other banks 
that are neither majority-owned nor governed by the state but for which any of the above-
mentioned criteria of being «politically-connected» applies comprise the broadest group of 
«state-influenced banks». 
 
5. Empirical results and interpretation 
 According to our classification, the category of «state-controlled banks» contains 44 
institutions of which 33 are the banks with identified state majority ownership and the 
remaining 11 are not state-owned but with elicited state control via governance. The 
breakdown of 64 «state-influenced banks» in our sample is shown below in Table 1.  
Table 1: Breakdown of «state-influenced banks», by 01.01.2009 
 Category      Number of institutions 
«State-influenced banks», total,     64 
  of which 
 «state-owned banks»       33 
 «state-controlled banks», other than «state-owned banks»  11 
 other «politically-connected banks»     20    
As of 01.01.2009 we estimate that 5 largest state-controlled banks accounted for 52.1% 
of total banking assets (Table 2). 
Table 2: Asset-share of 5 largest state-owned banks, %: 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sberbank 24.9 23 24.2 23.8 24.7 23.5 22.9 27.9 25.6 24.7 24 29.9
VTB Group* 3.9 6.7 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.1 6.3 7.4 8.3 7.7 8.7 11.3
Gazprombank 1.3 3.3 3.1 3 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.7 4.5 5.1 6.4 5.6
Rosselkhozbank 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.7 2.2 3.0
Bank Moskvy 0.7 1.1 1.5 1 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.3
Sub-total 30.8 34.1 35.9 34.6 36.1 35 34.7 42.2 41.2 41.7 43.9 52.1
* including VTB, Bank VTB 24 and Bank VTB North-West. 
Source: RosBusinessConsulting [2007], authors’ calculations for 2009 and 2008. 
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 We found that 63% of all banking assets were under certain degree of influence of the 
state, out of which some 59% were under quite a decisive influence. The ultimate market share 
of each group of banks measured as proportion of total banking assets in Russia is displayed in 
Fig.2. 
Figure 2: Banks with state participation*, as a percentage of total assets, by 01.01.2009 
 
* adjustment for the value of VEB’s banking assets provides an additional 2% to each of the 
combined asset shares 
Source: authors’ calculations and estimates 
We see two major trends concerning the scale of state participation. While the overall 
asset-share of key state-owned and state-controlled banks tends to increase (Fig. 3), at the 
micro level a reverse dynamics (i.e. the decrease of state share in some banks in our sample) 
has emerged. This trend of state ownership of banks being diluted might result from either 
initial or secondary public offerings (as in the cases of VTB and Sberbank with the state’s 
maintaining hold of majority stake) or, more frequently, from a more scant and contingent 
strategy of  private individuals gradually taking over  state share in a bank’s equity. The 
examples of this scenario concern major Russian state-controlled banks:  
- Bank Moskvy, with direct equity share of Moscow government having decreased from 
62.7% in 2004 to 46.5% at the beginning of 2009; and 
- VTB, with its announced sale of additional share issue in Russian Commercial Bank 
(Cyprus-located VTB subsidiary) to an entity controlled by the bank’s top-management.  
Above-mentioned empirical evidence provides room for further research of cyclicality 
of nationalizations and privatizations in Russia, as well as of the role of top-managers and 
other influential insiders in bank ownership and control.  
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Figure 3: Combined market share of top-5 state-owned banks* (as percentage of total 
banking assets, by beginning of the year, in %) 
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* Sberbank, VTB-group (including VTB, Bank VTB 24 and Bank VTB North-West),  
Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank and Bank Moskvy. 
 Source: RosBusinessConsulting [2007], authors’ calculations for 2009 and 2008. 
 
6. Conclusions and directions for further research  
Our analysis of the existing channels and extent of state participation in the Russian 
banking industry has provided several findings.  
First, we find empirical evidence that the channels of state influence over banks are not 
limited to equity ownership. Governance and other methods of control and influence are 
employed as well. Hence an analysis of ownership structure alone would not suffice to draw 
correct boundaries of the public sector. In a society like Russia, property is inseparable from 
power, so the two normally co-exist in some combination. Therefore the phenomenon of state 
banking requires a more extensive investigation due to high extent and institutional specificity 
of government intervention in the financial system. 
Second, we suggest a new classification of banks with state participation: (a) «state-
owned banks»; (b) «state-controlled banks»; and (c) «state-influenced banks». The former 
category is based on the criterion of controlling ownership and includes banks owned directly 
by the Governments itself or its various bodies and indirectly by state-controlled industrial 
companies. «State-controlled banks» category is broader and includes, in addition to (a), also 
those banks that are minority-owned by the state but governed by the state. Finally, «state-
influenced banks» is the broadest category that includes (a), (b), plus the banks that have fallen 
under state influence through close political connections or via other, ‘softer’ forms of control. 
Third, according to our own estimations based on the book value of banks in the 
sample, the actual scale of state presence is much higher than publicly declared 40% and falls 
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within the range between 56% and 63%, depending on the definition chosen. This proves the 
hypothesis about the presence of downward bias in official estimates and reports. 
Fourth, criteria and definitions presented in this paper provide a framework for further 
analysis of state banking phenomenon in Russia and other countries with institutional setup 
somewhat similar to Russia’s – e.g., in China, Vietnam or India.  Newly defined boundary of 
state sector in the banking industry might raise accuracy of econometric research of relative 
efficiency of state-connected banks, nature of their activities, and the impact of state 
participation on banking sector development. 
We envisage three broad directions for future research. At macro level the impact of the 
extent of state presence on the depth of financial intermediation and stability of the banking 
sector will be analyzed. At micro level we intend to investigate behavior patterns as well as the 
operating efficiency and other performance indicators of Russian banks depending on their 
ownership structure. The third avenue of further study deals with the direction of influence 
between the state and banks that are not directly or indirectly owned by the state. More 
specifically, we plan to find out whether in the financial sector ‘business capture’ prevails over 
‘state capture’ at this stage of Russia’s transformation. 
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